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In recent years the economic performance of public non-proﬁt sectors such
as cultural services has become an interesting economic issue. This is due
to the high dependence of cultural institutions on public funding on the one
hand and the increasing cost-pressure on public budgets on the other hand.
In order to achieve an eﬃciently, cost-minimizing resource allocation public
authorities who decide on the distribution of public budgets need reliable
performance indicators. Against this background, this paper analyzes the ef-
ﬁciency of German public theaters for the seasons 1991/1992 to 2005/2006.
Using a stochastic frontier analysis approach, we test whether the assump-
tion of cost-minimizing behavior is reliable in this sector. Moreover, several
panel data models that diﬀer in their ability to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity are applied to evaluate the impact of unobserved heterogeneity
on the eﬃciency estimates. The results indicate that the cost-minimizing as-
sumption cannot be maintained. Consequently, an eﬃciency analysis based
on a cost function approach seems inappropriate in the case of German pub-
lic theaters. Further, we ﬁnd a considerably unobserved heterogeneity across
the theaters, which causes a signiﬁcant variation in the models’ eﬃciency
estimates. This implies that failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity
leads to biased eﬃciency values. Overall, our results suggest that there is
still space for improvement in the employment of resources in the sector.
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11 Introduction
Like in most other European countries, the amount of public funding of cultural insti-
tutions in Germany is relatively high. This is due to national cultural policy aims such
as providing a cultural infrastructure and preserving cultural heritage. In particular,
performing arts institutions with cost-intensive production processes and relatively low
revenues rely heavily on public funding; on average, 81 percent of the income of Ger-
man public theaters comes from subsidies granted by local, federal or European public
authorities (Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association), 2008).
Given this high level of public funding and the increasing cost-pressure on public
budgets, the economic performance or eﬃciency of German public theaters has become
an interesting economic issue. In particular, public authorities who decide on the dis-
tribution of public budgets need reliable performance indicators in order to promote
an optimal, cost-minimizing employment of resources. In this context, the application
of benchmarking methods in public non-proﬁt sectors such as higher education, health
care or cultural services has become more important in recent years. Benchmarking or
eﬃciency analysis methods compare the economic performance of an individual ﬁrm to
a reference set of ﬁrms; that is, they detect the “best-practice” ﬁrms and provide clues
to the management of non-proﬁt institutions as well as for public authorities for a more
eﬃcient use of resources.
This paper gives further insights on the employment of resources for performing arts
productions. In contrast to other studies in this area that have used the non-parametric
data envelopment analysis method, we use the parametric stochastic frontier analysis
approach to evaluate the eﬃciency of public theaters in Germany. For that purpose, we
employ an input distance function that requires no speciﬁc behavior assumptions, such
as cost-minimization or proﬁt-maximization, and estimates the degree to which a theater
could reduce its use of inputs to produce a certain level of output. Further, in order
to compare our ﬁndings to those of previous studies that have utilized a cost function
approach and, in particular, to test their assumption of cost-minimizing behavior, we
also employ a cost function approach. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study on
performing arts institutions that applies both an input distance function and a cost
function model.
Moreover, since several studies have shown that failing to account for unobserved
ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity in performance measurement can result in overestimated in-
eﬃciency values (see, e.g. Farsi et al., 2005; Greene, 2005a,b), several panel data models
that diﬀer in their ability to account for unobserved heterogeneity are applied in order
to evaluate the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the eﬃciency estimates. In par-
ticular, we compare the estimation results of four diﬀerent stochastic frontier models
for panel data: the ﬁxed eﬀects model of Schmidt and Sickles (1984), the random ef-
fects model of Pitt and Lee (1981), the true random eﬀects model proposed by Greene
(2005a,b), and the true random eﬀects model with a Mundlak (1978) adjustment, as
suggested by Farsi et al. (2005). The panel data set employed consists of 174 German
public theaters and covers the 1991/1992 season through the 2005/2006 season.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical aspects of the ﬁ-
nancing of German public theaters and summarizes previous research on the economic
performance measurement of theaters. Speciﬁcations of the applied models are intro-
duced in Section 3, followed by a presentation of the estimation approach in Section 4,
and a description of the data in Section 5. Estimation results of the empirical analysis
are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical background and previous research
The current analysis investigates the eﬃciency of public theaters in Germany that are
funded by public authorities. Agreements between the public authorities and the the-
aters set the amount of funds granted to the theaters for periods of time that can span
several seasons, so theaters can plan the number of new productions and performances
and the corresponding factor input for the coming seasons.
According to Niskanen’s model of bureaucracy (1971) and its further development
by Migu´ e and B´ elanger (1974), managers of organizations in the public sector try to
maximize either the quantity of output or the resources granted by public authorities
because these two parameters are positively correlated with the arguments in their utility
functions. As Taalas proposed (1997), such arguments can be “desire for large audiences,
high quality of productions, or large budgets.” Thus, according to Niskanen’s model, a
higher output or a higher amount of available resources increases managers’ utility. It is
assumed that both public authorities and theater managers know the demand in terms of
quantity and quality of theater productions, whereas only the managers are fully aware
of the minimum costs. This information asymmetry enables theater managers to extend
either the output or the requested funds beyond the market equilibrium, based on their
own preferences (Migu´ e and B´ elanger, 1974).
Following the model of bureaucracy, in the case of German public theaters, where
the amount of funds is ﬁxed by the agreements between the theaters and the public
authorities that fund them, theater managers can utilize the information asymmetry
regarding the minimum costs in order to maximize their utility. If they claim higher
than the minimum costs for a certain output level, they will have more available resources
for each theater production, which enables them, for example, to hire famous actors or
to indulge in complex and expensive stage designs. Given the chosen output level, this
suggests that the inputs could be reduced.
However, one might argue that the assumption of information asymmetry between
theater managers and public authorities cannot be sustained. The German stage associ-
ation (Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein) publishes annual statistics that provide information on
the revenues and expenditures of all German public theaters. Although, these statistics
provide a general overview on the production structure of the theaters they do not al-
low to gain comprehensive theater-speciﬁc information about the cost-minimizing input
employment without a detailed and time-consuming cost structure analysis. Assuming
that budget and time constraints do not allow such a detailed analysis by the public
authorities in each single case, at least a partial information asymmetry remains.
3Referring to the subsidy system, the promotion of a cost-minimizing employment of
the granted resources is intended by the possibility to transfer unspent public funds from
one season to the next and, thus, to increase the budget for the next season. However,
the possibility for a higher budget in a subsequent season is a rather weak incentive
for spending less than the available funds in the current season because the theater
managers must fear that the subsidies will be reduced in case of recurrent savings and
transfers. Altogether, considering the theoretical explanations and the actual subsidy
system of public theaters in Germany, it is likely that the assumption of cost-minimizing
behavior is violated.
Several empirical studies have been conducted on the cost structure of performing arts
productions to assess potential economies of scale (see, e.g., Throsby, 1977; Globerman
and Book, 1974).1 These studies have all estimated a cost function, which implies that
the assumption of cost-minimizing behavior holds. Moreover, most newer studies have
used panel data sets to gain further information and to consider technical progress.
For example, Fazioli and Filippini (1997) used a dataset of 28 Italian theaters during
the period 1991-1993; to estimate a short-run cost function, they assumed that theater
managements minimize the variable costs for the production of performances and found
economies of scale and scope within the production process. Therefore, they suggested
that established productions should be performed more often in diﬀerent theaters in
order to take advantage of the size eﬀects and that, because of the economies of scope in
diﬀerent theater activities, theater groups should avoid specializing in particular types
of performances.
Taalas (1997) was among the ﬁrst to address possible ineﬃciencies regarding the em-
ployment of inputs in performing arts productions. He analyzed the cost structure of
37 Finnish theaters during 1985-1993 and found, as in the other studies, that the cost
function estimates indicated economies of scale in production. In order to test for al-
locative eﬃciency, Taalas compared the estimated shadow prices with the market prices
and found signiﬁcant diﬀerences, so he rejected the assumption of allocative eﬃciency
with respect to the use of inputs. His estimation results showed that, on average, the
observed total costs exceeded the minimum costs by nearly 5 percent. Taalas also sug-
gested that the violation of the cost-minimizing behavior may have been caused either by
the restrictions implied through public subsidies or by rent-seeking by theater managers.
Therefore, as Taalas noted, “a need for a detailed analysis of the extent of technical in-
eﬃciencies is accentuated. A full blown examination of both allocative and technical
eﬃciencies in the production of cultural services, however, necessitates the application
of cost or production frontiers.”
So far, only a few studies have used frontier techniques to identify possible sources
of ineﬃciencies in the production process of performing arts. Marco-Serrano (2006)
measured the technical eﬃciency of an unbalanced panel of Spanish theaters organized
in a network in the Valencia region during 1995-1999. His results, obtained by means of
data envelopment analysis, showed a decrease in the eﬃciency scores over the analyzed
1 For a detailed overview, see Marco-Serrano (2006).
4period, over which the network expanded continuously because of the incorporation of
new theaters.
Another study that applied data envelopment analysis was conducted by Tobias
(2003), who analyzed the cost eﬃciency of German Public Theaters for the seasons
1995/96-1998/99 using the same data source as in the present article. His overall ﬁnd-
ings reported average cost ineﬃciencies of about 11 percent.
Overall, previous studies on the cost structure of public theaters have focused on
economies of scale and scope, although more recent work has concentrated on possi-
ble ineﬃciencies in production as a result of the ﬁnding that the assumption of cost-
minimizing behavior is likely to be violated. Thus far, data envelopment analysis has
been applied to measure the ineﬃciencies in the context of performing arts productions,
but the current study uses a stochastic frontier analysis approach for panel data that
accounts for stochastic inﬂuences within the data.
3 Model speciﬁcation
In order to analyze the economic performance of German public theaters, we apply an
input distance function approach. Compared to a cost function approach, the input
distance function approach requires no preimposed behavioral assumption, such as cost-
minimization, which is likely to be violated in the case of the highly subsidized German
public theater sector. Nevertheless, in order to compare our ﬁndings to previous studies
that have utilized a cost function approach and in order to test their assumption of
cost-minimizing behavior, we also employ a cost function approach. If our hypothesis
that German public theaters do not show a cost-minimizing behavior is supported, the
coeﬃcient estimates of both functions must diﬀer because the linkage between the cost
and the distance function, based on the duality theory, would be lost.
By modeling a production technology as an input distance function, one can investi-
gate how much the input vector can be proportionally reduced while holding the output
vector ﬁxed. Following Coelli et al. (2005), the input distance function can be deﬁned
as:
DI (x,y) = max{θ : (x/θ) ∈ L(y)}, (1)
where L(y) represents the set of all non-negative input vectors x = (x1,...,xK) ∈ RK
+ that
can produce the non-negative output vector y = (y1,...,yM) ∈ RM
+ ; and θ measures the
proportional reduction of the input vector x. The function is homogenous of degree one
in inputs and satisﬁes the economic regularity conditions of monotonicity and concavity,
that is, the function is non-decreasing and concave in inputs and non-increasing in
outputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
From x ∈ L(y), DI(x,y) ≥ 1 follows. A value equal to one identiﬁes the respective
input vector x as being fully eﬃcient and located on the frontier of the input set. Values
greater than one belong to ineﬃcient input vectors above the frontier. This concept is
closely related to Farell’s (1957) measure of input-oriented technical eﬃciency, which
can be calculated by the reciprocal of the input distance function:
TE(x,y) = 1/DI (x,y) ≤ 1. (2)
5Technical eﬃciency values equal to one identify eﬃcient ﬁrms using an input vector
located on the production frontier. Technical eﬃciency values between zero and one
belong to ineﬃcient ﬁrms using an input vector above the frontier.
To estimate the input distance function we adopt a translog (transcendental-logarith-
mic) functional form. Unlike a Cobb-Douglas form, which assumes the same production
elasticities, the same scale elasticities, and a substitution elasticity equal to one for all
ﬁrms, the translog does not impose such restrictions, so it is more ﬂexible (Coelli et al.,
2005).
The translog input distance function for K (k=1,...,K) inputs and M (m=1,...,M)
outputs can be written as
lnD
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where the subscripts i and t denote the ﬁrm and year, respectively; DI
it is the input
distance term; xkit and ymit denote the input and output quantity, respectively; t =
1,...,T is a time trend; zsit (z = 1,...,S) is a vector of observable ﬁrm-characteristics
expected to inﬂuence the production technology; and α,β,γ,θ,λ,φ, and ψ are unknown
parameters to be estimated.
For the theoretical conditions of symmetry and linear homogeneity in inputs to be
guaranteed, several linear restrictions must hold for the input distance function. Sym-
metry requires the restrictions
αmn = αnm, (m,n = 1,2,...,M) and βkl = βlk, (k,l = 1,2,...,K), (4)









γkm = 0, and
K X
k=1
λkt = 0. (5)
Imposing the homogeneity restrictions by normalizing the distance term and the inputs
in Equation 3 by one of the inputs (Lovell et al., 1994), and replacing the negative log
6of the distance term −lnDI
it with an error term it, yields the estimable form of the
translog input distance function.2 The function can be written as















































φmt lnymit t +
S X
s=1
ψs zsit + it,
where x∗
kit = (xkit/xKit).
If it is assumed that the ﬁrms follow a cost-minimization behavior and that they
take input prices as given, economic theory implies duality between the input distance
function and the cost function approach. Following Shephard (1953), the dual cost
function can be deﬁned as:
C (x,y) = min
x {w
0x : x ∈ L(y)} = min
x {w
0x : DI(x,y) ≥ 1}, (7)
where L(y), x and y are as deﬁned above; and w0 is a strictly positive input price vector,
w = (w1,...,wK)0 ∈ RK
++. The function is non-negative and homogenous of degree
one in input prices and satisﬁes the economic regularity conditions of monotonicity and
concavity, that is, the function is non-decreasing and concave in input prices and non-
decreasing in outputs (F¨ are and Primont, 1995).
Using a translog functional form, the cost function in Equation 7 can be written as:
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where Cit are the total costs; wk denotes the k-th input price (k=1,...,K); and all other
variables and parameters are as deﬁned above.
Just as for the input distance function, the restrictions deﬁned in Equation 4 and 5
must be valid in order to guarantee symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices of
the cost function. Imposing the homogeneity restrictions by normalizing total costs and
2 The symmetry restrictions in Equation 4 are imposed during estimation.
7the input prices in Equation 8 by one of the input prices, and adding an error term it,
yields the estimable form of the translog cost function. The function can be written as:
− lnC
∗















































φmt lnymit t +
S X
s=1
ψs zsit + it,
where C∗
it = (Cit/wKit) and w∗
kit = (wkit/wKit).3
In addition to the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions, the input distance func-
tion and the cost function must satisfy the regularity conditions of monotonicity and
concavity. If these conditions are violated, the estimated parameters are not consistent
with economic theory and, hence, are not reliable (Sauer et al., 2006). For example, a
monotonicity-violating input distance function will provide incorrectly signed elasticity
estimates and implies the economically absurd result that, for ﬁxed outputs, an increase
in inputs will improve economic performance (O’Donnell and Coelli, 2005). Further,
cost function estimates that violate the regularity conditions give reason to question the
assumption of cost-minimizing behavior; duality theory fails and the elasticities of the
cost function with respect to input prices are not equal to the corresponding input cost
shares (Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli, 2006).
For the purpose of securing theoretical consistency, monotonicity and concavity can
either be imposed ex ante on the estimated function or tested after the estimation. As
Kuenzle (2005) argued, the advantage of an after-estimation test is that it provides
further insight into the empirical model and the industry; that is, after-estimation tests
can provide hints about whether the functional form, the variables and the assumed
behavior of the ﬁrms provide an appropriate image of the industry under consideration.
Since we want to investigate whether a translog cost function approach with a cost-
minimizing assumption is appropriate in the case of German public theaters, we follow
this argument and test the regularity conditions ex post.4
To be monotone, the input distance function must be non-decreasing in inputs and
non-increasing in outputs at each data point. For the translog case, this condition is










γkm lnym + λkt t ≥ 0 (10)
3 Alternative model speciﬁcations for the input distance and the cost function, such as a Cobb-Douglas
functional form, a translog functional form with no technical change and a translog functional form
with Hicks neutral technical change, have been tested and rejected by likelihood-ratio tests.












γkm lnxk + φmt t ≤ 0; (11)
that is, the elasticity of D with respect to xk is non-negative, and the elasticity of D
with respect to ym is non-positive for all inputs and outputs.
Similarly, for the cost function, monotonicity holds if the function is non-decreasing
in input prices and non-decreasing in outputs at each data point. For the translog case,





















γkm lnxk + φmt t ≥ 0; (13)
that is, both the elasticity of C with respect to xk and the elasticity of C with respect
to ym are non-negative for all input prices and outputs.
Satisfying the concavity condition requires that the input distance function be concave
in inputs and the cost function be concave in input prices. For the input distance
function, this requires that the Hessian matrix of the second-order derivatives of D with
respect to xk be negative semi-deﬁnite; that is, all leading principle minors of the matrix
must alternate in sign, beginning with negative. Similarly, the cost function is concave in
input prices if negative semi-deﬁniteness holds for the Hessian matrix of the second-order
derivatives of C with respect to wk.
Following Diewert and Wales (1987), it can be shown that the Hessian matrix of the
translog input distance function with respect to the inputs – or the translog cost function
with respect to the input prices – is negative semi-deﬁnite if, and only if, the matrix ˆ H





























where, for the input distance function case, βkl are the second-order coeﬃcients of the
inputs and ek are the input elasticities, and, for the cost function case, βkl are the
second-order coeﬃcients of the input prices and ek are the input price elasticities.
4 Estimation approach
In order to estimate the technical and cost eﬃciency of German public theaters and
to investigate the inﬂuence of unobserved heterogeneity on the estimation results, we
follow Farsi et al. (2005) and apply four diﬀerent stochastic frontier models for panel
9data. Following Greene (2005a), a general stochastic frontier model for panel data can
be expressed as:
dit = α + β
0rit + vit + Sui, (15)
where dit and rit stand either for the dependent and independent variables in the dis-
tance function model, as speciﬁed in Equation 6, or for the dependent and independent
variables in the cost function model, as speciﬁed in Equation 8. Furthermore, vit and
ui are the two parts of a composed random error, it = vit + Sui, where vit represents a
random error term that captures noise as well as any ﬁrm and time-speciﬁc unobserved
heterogeneity; and ui is a non-negative time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc ineﬃciency term. S
equals -1 in the case of a distance function and 1 in the case of a cost function. Finally,
α is a constant and β0 is a vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated.
The four models diﬀer in their assumptions about the distribution of the two error
components, as well as in their estimation approach for the ineﬃciency indicators and,
therefore, in their eﬃciency scores. Given Farrell’s measure of technical eﬃciency and
given the deﬁnition of cost eﬃciency as the ratio of optimal costs to observed costs,
the eﬃciency scores range between zero and one, where a value equal to one indicates
eﬃciency. A summary of the econometric speciﬁcations of the models is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Econometric speciﬁcationsa
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i}) wit = αi + it wit = δi + it
aThe superscripts d and c stand for the distance function and the cost function, respectively.
Model I is a ﬁxed eﬀects model as proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). Apart from
the assumption that vit is independent and identically distributed (iid) with zero mean
and constant variance and is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables no further
distributional assumptions are required. In particular, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ineﬃciency term
ui and, hence, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects αi = α + Sui are allowed to correlate
10with the explanatory variables or with vit. In case of an input distance function, the
ﬁrm’s ineﬃciency is estimated by the deviation from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept ˆ αd
i to the
maximum intercept in the sample, that is ˆ ud
i = max{ˆ αd
i}− ˆ αd
i, and in the case of a cost
function by the deviation from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept ˆ αc
i to the minimum intercept
in the sample, that is ˆ uc
i = ˆ αc
i − min{ˆ αc
i}.
Model II is a random eﬀects model as proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981). In this model
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ineﬃciency term ui is an iid half-normally distributed random eﬀect
which is independently distributed from the iid normally distributed random error term
vit. Further, both error components are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables and each other. The model estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood
estimation, and, as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982), the ﬁrm’s ineﬃciency is estimated




(Farsi et al., 2005).
Both models have assets and drawbacks. Since the ﬁxed eﬀects model identiﬁes at least
one ﬁrm as 100% eﬃcient, the ineﬃciency of the other ﬁrms can only be measured relative
to the best-practice ﬁrm(s) in the sample. That is, the ineﬃciency estimates are sensitive
to sample selection and outliers (Kuenzle, 2005; Farsi and Filipini, 2004). Further, since
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator does not allow to include any time-invariant variables in
the estimation, it cannot account for any observed time-invariant heterogeneity. Both
problems can be solved by the random eﬀects model. However, the main advantage of the
ﬁxed eﬀects model is that the estimated coeﬃcients are not aﬀected by any correlation
between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects and the explanatory variables. In contrast, the estimates
of the random eﬀects model will be biased in this case.
Moreover, the ﬁxed and random eﬀects models have two additional shortcomings in
common. First, both models assume constant ineﬃciency over time which is rather
unrealistic in relatively long panels. Second, any time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved
heterogeneity is included in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component and thus in the ineﬃciency
estimates. In other words, if any time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity
is existent, the conventional ﬁxed and random eﬀects models tend to overestimate the
ineﬃciency (Greene, 2005a; Farsi et al., 2005).
Model III is the true random eﬀects model proposed by Greene (2005a,b). This model
accounts for the shortcomings of the conventional panel data models by adding a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc random term αi. The model can be expressed as
dit = α + αi + β
0rit + vit + Suit, (16)
where αi represents time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and uit rep-
resents time-varying ﬁrm-speciﬁc ineﬃciency. All other notation is as deﬁned before.
The error components vit and uit are distributed as in the random eﬀects model and the
unobserved heterogeneity component αi is iid normally distributed. Further, vit, uit and
αi are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and each other. As in
the random eﬀects model, the ﬁrm’s ineﬃciency is estimated by the conditional mean
of the ineﬃciency term ˆ uit = E[ui| ˆ wit], where wit = αi + it.
This speciﬁcation separates time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity from time-varying
ineﬃciency and therefore relaxes the main limitations of the conventional panel data
11models. However, since all time-invariant eﬀects are treated as unobserved heterogeneity
and are captured by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant any persistent ineﬃciency is not included
in the ineﬃciency term. Consequently, as the conventional ﬁxed and random eﬀects
models tend to overestimate the ineﬃciency, the true random eﬀects model tends to
underestimate it (Farsi et al., 2006).
Model IV is an extension to Model III. As suggested by Farsi et al. (2005), it uses
Mundlak’s (1978) formulation to overcome the possible bias problem in the true random
eﬀects model that results if any correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponent αi and the explanatory variables rit is existent. Mundlak’s formulation accounts
for these correlations with an auxiliary regression that can be written as:
αi = γ





rit, δi ∼ N(0,σ
2
δ), (17)
where ¯ ri represents a vector of the group means of the explanatory variables rit; γ0 is the
corresponding vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated; and δi is an normally distributed
random term that is not correlated with the explanatory variables. Incorporated in
Equation 16 the auxiliary coeﬃcients γx capture any linear correlation between αi and
¯ ri and, thus, minimize the possible bias of the main model’s coeﬃcients (Farsi et al.,
2005).
5 Data
The utilized data set is an unbalanced panel of 174 German public theaters observed
for the seasons 1991/1992 to 2005/2006. The data were taken from the theater reports
published annually by the Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association) (1993-
2007).
First, to identify and eliminate any outliers we apply the method suggested by Hadi
(1992, 1994), which identiﬁes multiple outliers in multivariate data. Moreover, all the-
aters with less than four observations are excluded from the estimation. For the input
distance function model this procedure leaves a total of 1433 observations from 126 the-
aters and for the cost function model a total of 1413 observations from 124 theaters,
respectively. For both models, we use a supply-based output measure as proposed by
Tobias (2003) and include three input variables as measures for labor and capital input.
Since the theaters run stages with auditoriums of diﬀerent sizes, including only the
number of performances as an output measure would bias the use of inputs regarding the
quantity of output. Therefore, in order to account for the diﬀerences in size, we measure
the output using the variable number of supplied tickets, calculated as the number of
performances per season multiplied by the number of seats.5 For the distance function
model, the total salary expenses and the operating expenses per season are used as
5 Most theaters run several stages so, the number of supplied tickets is calculated for every stage and
then summed.
12monetary measures for the quantities of labor and capital.6 The salary expenses are
divided into salary expenses for artistic staﬀ and salary expenses for administrative and
technical staﬀ. This division allows for a more detailed identiﬁcation of possible sources
of ineﬃciency. The operating expenses include, among other things, administration
costs, leasing and ﬁre service expenditures.
In addition, to account for observed heterogeneity three ﬁrm characteristic variables
are taken into account. First, as described in Section 2, the theaters are aware of
the amount of subsidies granted by the public authorities when they plan productions
for upcoming seasons, so we include a variable reﬂecting the amount of subsidies in the
model in order to test for the impact of public funding on eﬃciency. We assume that this
variable has a negative impact on eﬃciency. Further, the production technology of the
theaters diﬀers signiﬁcantly by the number of stages that belong to one theater. Given
the same amount of output, it can be assumed that a theater with more than one stage
has higher input requirements than a theater with only one stage. Therefore, we expect
the second ﬁrm characteristic variable included in the model, the number of stages, to
have a negative impact on eﬃciency. Finally, the third ﬁrm characteristic incorporated
in the model is the number of diﬀerent productions per season. Besides their public
mission regarding the maintenance of cultural diversity, theaters have incentives to oﬀer
a range of diﬀerent plays in order to attract large audiences. However, producing plays is
cost-intensive and is expected to have a negative impact on eﬃciency, while re-runs of an
established production are much less expensive for the theater. Moreover, the necessary
rearrangements of stage designs that result from changing productions, irrespective of
whether the productions are new or not, result in higher costs. Therefore the variable,
number of productions per season, is included in order to control for the impact on input
requirements.
For the cost function model, in addition to the total costs, given as the sum of total
salary expenses and operating expenses, the input variables must be included in terms
of prices. Therefore, to calculate the prices for labor, the two salary expense variables
are divided by the appropriate number of employees in order to get the price for artistic
staﬀ and the price for administrative and technical staﬀ. Accordingly, following Taalas
(1997), the price for capital is given by the operating expenses divided by the number
of seats, which is used as a proxy for the capital stock. Finally, the same output and
ﬁrm characteristic variables as in the input distance function model are included.
Tables 2 and 3 report the summary statistics of the output variable, the input vari-
ables and the ﬁrm characteristic variables of the input distance function model and the
cost function model. The descriptive statistics show signiﬁcant variance regarding all
variables. For example, the largest theater in terms of output supplies 97 times more
tickets than the smallest theater in the data set.7 This variance results from the diﬀerent
auditorium sizes and number of stages run by each theater.
6 All monetary measures are adjusted for inﬂation using the consumer price index for Germany
(Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Oﬃce), 2009). Values are stated in year-2005 Euros.
7 The largest theater in terms of tickets supplied is Niedersaechsisches Staatstheater Hannover, which
includes the state opera house and the Schauspielhaus, resulting overall in about 2360 seats. The
smallest theater is the Schlosstheater Moers, which has about 300 seats.
13Table 2: Input distance function – summary statistics
Variable description Variable Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Number of supplied tickets (103) Y 171 160 108 6 596
Salary expenses for artistic
staﬀ (103 EUR) XLart 6432 5899 5082 163 27800
Salary expenses for administrative
and technical staﬀ (103 EUR) XLad 5257 4229 4139 23 25300
Operating expenses (103 EUR) XC 2559 2074 1928 42 11400
Amount of subsidies (103 EUR) SUB 13000 11500 9540 218 54700
Number of stages ST 4 4 2 1 13
Number of productions PROD 29 26 14 2 79
Number of observations 1433
Source: Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association) (1993-2007)
Table 3: Cost function – summary statistics
Variable description Variable Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Number of supplied tickets (103) Y 175 163 110 6 596
Total annual costs (103 EUR) TC 14600 12400 10800 326 61100
Price for artistic staﬀ
(103 EUR/employee) PLart 54 51 17 13 138
Price for administrative and tech-
nical staﬀ (103 EUR/employee) PLad 37 37 9 8 76
Price for capital (EUR/seat) PC 1861 1534 1215 93 9851
Amount of subsidies (103 EUR) SUB 13300 12000 9814 218 56000
Number of stages ST 4 4 2 1 13
Number of productions PROD 30 27 14 2 90
Number of observations 1413
Source: Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association) (1993-2007)
Table 4 presents the fraction of within variation of the overall variation for the variables
included in the two models. The ﬁgures indicate that the variables show a signiﬁcant
fraction of within variation. Altogether, the descriptive statistics indicate that the used
variables show a reasonable between and within variation, which ﬁnding supports the
use of panel data models and the use of ﬁxed eﬀects models in particular.
14Table 4: Fraction of within variationa






−ln(XC) 0.20 ln(TC/PC) 0.32
lnY 0.17 lnY 0.17
ln(XLart/XC) 0.39 ln(PLart/PC) 0.55
ln(XLad/XC) 0.47 ln(PLad/PC) 0.51
lnSUB 0.11 lnSUB 0.10
lnST 0.51 lnST 0.53
lnPROD 0.43 lnPROD 0.45
a Within variation represents the standard deviation of theater observations from the theater’s
average (Xit − ¯ Xi). The fraction of within variation is deﬁned as the ratio of within to overall standard
deviation (Farsi et al., 2005).
6 Results
The parameter estimates of the input distance and the cost function for all models are
presented in Table 5. As each variable is in natural logarithm and is normalized by
its sample median, the ﬁrst-order coeﬃcients can be interpreted as distance and cost
elasticities at the sample median ﬁrm, respectively.
Considering the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations a Hausman test conducted on both
functions indicates that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are correlated with the explanatory
variables. This suggests that the estimated coeﬃcients of Models II and III, which do
not account for this correlation, are biased. In contrast, since our data set shows a
reasonable within variation and covers a suﬃcient long time period of 15 years, the
results of the ﬁxed eﬀects model can be considered as unbiased parameter estimates.8
First, focusing on the distance function estimates, the results show that all ﬁrst-order
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and have the expected signs
across all models. In other words, at the sample median ﬁrm, the estimated input
distance function is decreasing in outputs and increasing in inputs. The magnitude of
the coeﬃcients diﬀers slightly across the models, indicating slightly biased estimation
results for Models II and III. The smallest diﬀerence among the models’ coeﬃcients is
observed between Models I and IV. In conjunction with the statistical signiﬁcance of
17 out of the 20 Mundlak terms in Model IV this suggests that the applied Mundlak
formulation is able to account for correlations between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects and the
explanatory variables, and, thus, to reduce the resulting bias.9
8 In short panels the so called ‘` ıncidental parameter’ problem arises, yielding inconsistent parameter
estimates.
9 The Mundlak terms of Model IV are not reported to conserve space. For both functions 17 out of



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Given the unbiased estimates of Model I, the estimated input elasticities for salary
expenses for artistic staﬀ (β1) and for salary expenses for administrative and technical
staﬀ (β2) are found to be equal to 0.490 and 0.372, respectively. The input elasticity
for operating expenses (β3) is calculated via the homogeneity restriction presented in
Equation 5 and equals 0.138. Interpreted as shadow shares, the input elasticities indicate
that expenses for artistic staﬀ account for 49.0 percent, expenses for administrative and
technical staﬀ account for 37.2 percent, and operating expenses account for 13.8 percent
of total costs at the sample median ﬁrm. These values are similar to the observed
cost shares at the sample median ﬁrm that account for 48.3, 34.7, and 17.0 percent,
respectively.
The ﬁrst-order coeﬃcient of time (θt) is -0.004. Independent of the negative sign
that implies regressive technical change, the fairly low magnitude suggests almost no
technical change for the sample median ﬁrm in the mid year of the sample. This result
can be explained by the very limited possibilities of the performing arts to beneﬁt from
labor or capital-saving technological improvements compared to other sectors (Fazioli
and Filippini, 1997).
Referring to the ﬁrms’ characteristics, two out of the three coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent level. First, the statistically signiﬁcant and negative
coeﬃcient of subsidies (ψ1) implies that a 1 percent increase in the amount of subsidies
will increase the input requirements by 0.62 percent at the sample median ﬁrm. This
result is consistent with previous research (Bishop and Brand, 2003) and conﬁrms our
expectation that public funding has a negative impact on eﬃciency. Furthermore, it
corroborates the hypothesis that the assumption of cost-minimizing behavior is violated
in the highly subsidized German public theater sector. Second, the statistically signiﬁ-
cant and negative coeﬃcient of the number of productions (ψ3) suggests an increase of
input requirements of 2.6 percent for an additional production at the sample median
ﬁrm. This result shows that the aim of cultural diversity comes at some costs.
As for the distance function estimates, the ﬁrst-order coeﬃcients of the cost function
estimates are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and have the expected
signs across all models. In other words, at the sample median ﬁrm, the estimated cost
function is increasing in outputs and in input prices. Again, the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients diﬀers slightly across the models indicating slightly biased estimation results
of Models II and III. However, the unbiased estimates of Model I are rather diﬀerent
than the estimates of the corresponding input distance function model. In particular,
the cost elasticities with respect to input prices that can be interpreted as shadow
shares diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the input distance function estimates. Summarized, the
cost function estimates indicate that expenses for artistic staﬀ (β1) account for 39.9
percent, expenses for administrative and technical staﬀ (β2) account for 45.1 percent,
and operating expenses (β3) account for 15.0 percent of total costs at the sample median
ﬁrm. Except for the operating expenses estimate, these values are quite diﬀerent from
the observed cost shares as well as from the distance function shadow shares.
As noted by Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli (2006), one possible–and in our case the
most likely–reason for this diﬀerence is the violation of the cost-minimization assump-
17tion.10 This conclusion is further supported by the posteriori test results on the violations
of the regularity conditions. While the monotonicity condition is violated in less than 1
percent of the observations in both the distance and the cost function, the violation rate
of the curvature condition is rather high in the cost function compared to the distance
function. While the curvature condition across all estimated models is violated at the
maximum of about 20 percent of the observations in the distance function, the viola-
tion rate in the cost function diﬀers from as high as 94 percent in Model I to at least
25 percent in Model IV.11 To sum up, these results suggest that the cost-minimizing
assumption is violated; thus, the cost function estimates are rather unreliable. Conse-
quently, an eﬃciency analysis based on a translog cost function approach seems to be
inappropriate in the case of German public theaters.
The summary statistics of the estimated technical eﬃciency scores are reported in Ta-
ble 6.12 As expected, the results diﬀer considerably across the four models. In particular,
the eﬃciency estimates of the conventional ﬁxed and random eﬀects models (Models I
and II) are rather low compared to the eﬃciency estimates of the true random eﬀects
models (Models III and IV).
Table 6: Summary statistics of technical eﬃciency scores
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Minimum 0.213 0.331 0.826 0.822
Maximum 1.000 0.994 0.993 0.992
Mean 0.367 0.724 0.967 0.964
Median 0.336 0.715 0.968 0.966
5 percentile 0.239 0.617 0.951 0.944
For Model I, the mean eﬃciency value of 0.367 implies that on average, the same
output quantity could have been produced despite reducing the input usage by more
than 63 percent. Model II shows a much higher mean eﬃciency value of 0.724, indicat-
ing a possible input reduction of about 28 percent on average. Further, the minimum
eﬃciency values of Model I and Model II, 0.213 and 0.331, suggest an input saving
potential of about 67 to 79 percent, respectively, for the most ineﬃcient observations.
These results, particularly the mean eﬃciency value of Model I, seem rather unrealistic
and can be explained by the fact that both models assume constant ineﬃciency over
time and do not separate ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity from ineﬃciency. That
is, any unobserved heterogeneity that inﬂuences the ﬁrm-speciﬁc production structure
is included in the eﬃciency scores. Moreover, since Model I identiﬁes at least one obser-
10 Other possible reasons noted by Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli (2006) are measurement errors in
either the input quantities or prices or an endogenous regressor problem in the distance function
model. See Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli (2006) for a further discussion.
11 The violation rate of the curvature condition in the distance (cost) function is 20 (94) percent in
Model I, 18 (67) percent in Model II, 19 (26) percent in Model III, and 20 (25) percent in Model IV.
12 Since the cost function estimates are considered less reliable the estimated cost eﬃciency scores are
not reported to conserve space. The results are available on request from the authors.
18vation as 100 percent eﬃcient, its eﬃciency estimates are sensitive to sample selection
and outliers that could result in highly downward biased eﬃciency values.
Turning to Models III and IV that account for the shortcomings of Models I and
II by assuming time-varying ineﬃciency and distinguishing unobserved heterogeneity
from ineﬃciency, the mean eﬃciency values of 0.967 and 0.964, respectively, indicate a
possible input reduction of about 3 percent on average. Combined with the minimum
eﬃciency values of 0.826 and 0.822, respectively, that suggest an input saving potential
of about 17 percent for the most ineﬃcient observations, and the 5th percentile values
of 0.951 and 0.944, respectively, which suggest that in only 5 percent of all observations
the input saving potential is higher than approximately 5 percent, these results seem to
be more reasonable. Further, the nearly identical eﬃciency results of Models III and IV
indicate that the eﬃciency estimates are not inﬂuenced considerably by a bias resulting
from any correlation between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects and the explanatory variables.
7 Conclusions
In this study, we analyzed the eﬃciency of German public theaters for the seasons
1991/1992 to 2005/2006. Based on a stochastic frontier analysis approach, we tested
whether the assumption of cost-minimizing behavior is reliable and thus, whether an
eﬃciency analysis via a cost function approach is appropriate in this sector. In addi-
tion, several panel data models that diﬀer in their ability to account for unobserved
heterogeneity were applied to evaluate the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the
eﬃciency estimates.
With regard to the cost-minimizing behavior, both the diﬀerences between the esti-
mated cost function’s shadow shares and the observed cost shares as well as the high
violation rate of the regularity conditions in the cost function approach suggest that
the assumption of cost-minimizing behavior cannot be maintained. This conclusion is
supported by the theoretically consistent result that higher subsidies lead ceteris paribus
to relatively higher input requirements. Consequently, an eﬃciency analysis based on
a cost function approach that presumes a cost-minimizing behavior may provide bi-
ased eﬃciency estimates and, hence, seems inappropriate in the case of German public
theaters.
Referring to the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the eﬃciency estimates, our
results are consistent with previous research (see, e.g., Farsi and Filipini, 2004; Farsi
et al., 2005). We observe considerably diﬀerences between the conventional ﬁxed eﬀects
and random eﬀects models that do not separate ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity
from ineﬃciency and the two true random eﬀects models that do. Hence, our results
imply that the German public theater sector is characterized by considerably unobserved
heterogeneity across the theaters, which inﬂuences the theater-speciﬁc production struc-
ture. Given the rather unrealistic eﬃciency estimates of the conventional models, it can
be assumed that these models, particularly the ﬁxed eﬀects model, underestimate the
eﬃciency. Alternatively, the true random eﬀects models treat all time-invariant eﬀects
as unobserved heterogeneity, including any persistent ineﬃciency; hence, they may over-
19estimate the eﬃciency to a certain degree. Nevertheless, the results of the true random
eﬀects models seem to be more realistic. Both models indicate an input saving potential
of about 3 percent on average and a maximum input saving potential of about 5 percent
for 95 percent of all observations.
Overall, our results suggest that there is still space for improvement in the employment
of resources in the German public theater sector. In particular, given the doubts about
the existence of cost-minimizing behavior in the presence of the actual subsidy system,
public authorities should carefully reassess the system with a particular focus on the
implementation of cost-minimizing incentives.
In this context, it should be noted that our eﬃciency results are solely based on a
technical view of performing arts production. Due to the lack of data we were not
able to include any quality aspects into our analysis and, therefore, the results provide
no information on the relationship between eﬃciency and quality. Consequently, the
judgement whether the measured technical ineﬃciency of an individual theater is due to
poor employment of the resources or to higher input requirements as a result of a higher
quality level remains with the public authorities. While budget cuts are appropriate in
case of a theater that reveals both a high technical ineﬃciency level and a poor quality
level, a certain degree of technical ineﬃciency might be acceptable in case of a theater
that provides a high quality level and, hence, should not result in budget cuts.
To sum up, our analysis provides information on one side of the story – technical
eﬃciency – which connected with the other side of the story – quality – can help public
authorities to identify the best-performing theaters and to derive the best-practice pro-
duction strategies. As suggested by Farsi et al. (2005), the results of such an analysis
can be used to predict an interval of necessary costs for each theater and, thus, can re-
duce the information asymmetry regarding minimum costs in the context of negotiations
between theater managers and public authorities.
References
Bishop, P. and Brand, S. (2003), ‘The eﬃciency of museums: a stochastic frontier pro-
duction function approach’, Applied Economics 35, 1853–1858.
Coelli, T. J., Prasada Rao, D. S., O’Donell, C. J. and Battese, G. E. (2005), An Intro-
duction to Eﬃciency and Productivity Analysis, 2 edn, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
New York.
Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association) (1993-2007), ‘Theaterstatistik
1991/92–2005/06 (Theater Reports 1991/92–2005/06)’, Koblenz/K¨ oln.
Deutscher B¨ uhnenverein (German Stage Association) (2008), ‘Theaterstatistik 2006/07
(Theater Report 2006/07)’, Koblenz/K¨ oln.
F¨ are, R. and Primont, D. (1995), Multi–Output Production and Duality: Theory and
Applications, Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York.
20Farrell, M. J. (1957), ‘The Measurement of Technical Eﬃciency’, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series A (General) 120(3), 253–290.
Farsi, M. and Filipini, M. (2004), ‘Regulation and Measuring Cost Eﬃciency with Panel
Data Models: Application to Electricity Distribution Utilities’, Review of Industrial
Organization 25, 1–19.
Farsi, M., Filipini, M. and Greene, W. (2005), ‘Eﬃciency Measurement in Network
Industries: Application to the Swiss Railway Companies’, Journal of Regulatory Eco-
nomics 28(1), 69–90.
Farsi, M., Filippini, M. and Greene, W. (2006), ‘Application of Panel Data Models in
Benchmarking Analysis of the Electricity Distribution Sector’, Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics 77(3), 271–290.
Fazioli, R. and Filippini, M. (1997), ‘Cost Structure and Product Mix of Local Public
Theatres’, Journal of Cultural Economics 21, 77–86.
Globerman, S. and Book, S. H. (1974), ‘Statistical Cost Functions for Performing Arts
Organizations’, Southern Economic Journal 40(4), 668–671.
Greene, W. (2005a), ‘Fixed and Random Eﬀects in Stochastic Frontier Models’, Journal
of Productivity Analysis 23, 7–32.
Greene, W. (2005b), ‘Reconsidering Heterogeneity in Panel Data Estimators of the
Stochastic Frontier Model’, Journal of Econometrics 126, 269–303.
Hadi, A. S. (1992), ‘Identifying multiple outliers in multivariate data’, Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Series B 54(3), 761–771.
Hadi, A. S. (1994), ‘A modiﬁcation of a method for the detection of outliers in multi-
variate samples’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 56(2), 393–396.
Jondrow, J., Lovell, K., Materov, I. and Schmidt, P. (1982), ‘On the Estimation of
Technical Ineﬃciency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model’, Journal
of Econometrics 19, 233–238.
Kuenzle, M. (2005), ‘Cost Eﬃciency in Network Industries: Application of Stochas-
tic Frontier Analysis’, Dissertation ETH No. 16117, http://e-collection.ethbib.
ethz.ch/eserv/eth:27980/eth-27980-01.pdf, 02.08.2008.
Kumbhakar, S. C. and Lovell, C. A. K. (2000), Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Marco-Serrano, F. (2006), ‘Monitoring managerial eﬃciency in the performing arts: A
regional theaters network perspective’, Annals of Operations Research 145, 167–181.
Migu´ e, J.-L. and B´ elanger, G. (1974), ‘Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discre-
tion’, Public Choice 17, 27–47.
21Mundlak, Y. (1978), ‘On the Pooling of Times Series and Cross Section Data’, Econo-
metrica 46(1), 69–85.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine Atherton,
Chicage/New York.
O’Donnell, C. J. and Coelli, T. J. (2005), ‘A Bayesian approach to imposing curvature
on distance functions’, Journal of Econometrics 126, 493–523.
Pitt, M. and Lee, L.-F. (1981), ‘The Measuement and Sources of Technical Ineﬃciency
in the Inndonesian Weaving Industry’, Journal of Development Economics 9, 43–64.
Rungsuriyawiboon, S. and Coelli, T. (2006), Regulatory Reform and Economic Perfor-
mance in US Electricity Generation, in T. Coelli and D. Lawrence, eds, ‘Performance
measurement and regulation of network utilities’, Edward Elgar, Northampton, Mass,
US, pp. 267–296.
Sauer, J., Frohberg, K. and Hockmann, H. (2006), ‘Stochastic Eﬃciency Measurement:
The Curse of Theoretical Consistency’, Journal of Applied Economics IX(1), 139–165.
Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R. (1984), ‘Production Frontiers and Panel Data’, Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 2(4), 367–374.
Shephard, R. W. (1953), Cost and Production Functions, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Oﬃce) (2009), ‘Verbraucher-
preisindizes f¨ ur Deutschland (German Consumer Price Indexes)’, https:
//www-ec.destatis.de/csp/shop/sfg/bpm.html.cms.cBroker.cls?cmspath=
struktur,vollanzeige.csp&ID=1023986, 07.01.2009.
Taalas, M. (1997), ‘Generalised Cost Functions for Producers of Performing Arts - Al-
locative Ineﬃciencies and Scale Economies in Theatres’, Journal of Cultural Eco-
nomics 21, 335–353.
Throsby, C. D. (1977), Production and Cost Relationships in the Supply of Performing
Arts, in K. A. Tucker, ed., ‘Economics of the Australian Service Sector’, Croom Helm,
London, pp. 414–432.
Tobias, S. (2003), ‘Kosteneﬃzientes Theater? Deutsche B¨ uhnen im DEA-Vergleich
(Cost-eﬃcient performing arts? German Theatres in a DEA Comparison)’, Dis-
sertation Technische Universit¨ at Dortmund, http://hdl.handle.net/2003/2902,
07.03.2009.
22Working Paper Series in Economics 
(recent issues) 
No.133:  Markus Groth: Das Conservation Research Program: Erfahrungen und Perspektiven für 
die europäische Agrarumweltpolitik, Juli 2009 
No.132:  Stefan Baumgärtner and Sebastian Strunz: The economic insurance value of ecosystem 
resilience, July 2009 
No.131:  Matthias Schröter, Oliver Jakoby, Roland Olbrich, Marcus Eichhorn and Stefan 
Baumgärtner: Remote sensing of bush encroachment on commercial cattle farms in 
semi-arid rangelands in Namibia, July 2009  
No.130:  Nils Braakmann: Other-regarding preferences, spousal disability and happiness: 
Evidence for German Couples, May 2009 
No.129:  Alexander Vogel and Joachim Wagner: Exports and Profitability – First Evidence for 
German Services Enterprises, May 2009 
No.128:  Sebastian Troch: Drittelbeteiligung im Aufsichtsrat – Gesetzliche Regelung versus 
Unternehmenspraxis. Ausmaß und Bestimmungsgründe der Umgehung des 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetzes in Industrieunternehmen, Mai 2009 
No.127:  Alexander Vogel: The German Business Services Statistics Panel 2003 to 2007, May 
2009 
[forthcoming in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 129 (2009)] 
No.126:  Nils Braakmann: The role of firm-level and regional human capital fort he social returns 
to education – Evidence from German social security data, April 2009 
No.125:  Elke Bertke und Markus Groth: Angebot und Nachfrage nach Umweltleistungen in 
einem marktanalogen Agrarumweltprogramm – Ergebnisse einer Pilotstudie, April 2009 
No.124:  Nils Braakmann and Alexander Vogel: The impact of the 2004 EU-enlargement on 
enterprise performance and exports of service enterprises in the German eastern border 
region, April 2009 
No.123:  Alexander Eickelpasch and Alexander Vogel: Determinants of Export Behaviour of 
German Business Services Companies, March 2009 
No.122:  Maik Heinemann: Stability under Learning of Equilibria in Financial Markets with Supply 
Information, March 2009 
No.121:  Thomas Wein: Auf der Speisekarte der DPAG: Rechtliche oder ökonomische 
Marktzutrittsschranken? März 2009 
No.120:  Nils Braakmann und Joachim Wagner: Product Diversification and Stability of 
Employment and Sales: First Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms, February 
2009 
No.119:  Markus Groth:  The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity 
conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany, 
February 2009 
No.118:  Anja Klaubert: Being religious – A Question of Incentives? February 2009 
No.117:  Sourafel Girma, Holger Görg and Joachim Wagner: Subsidies and Exports in Germany. 
First Evidence from Enterprise Panel Data, January 2009 
No.116:  Alexander Vogel und Joachim Wagner: Import, Export und Produktivität in 
niedersächsischen Unternehmen des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes, Januar 2009    
No.115:  Nils Braakmann and Joachim Wagner:  Product Differentiation and Profitability in 
German Manufacturing Firms, January 2009 
No.114:  Franziska Boneberg: Die Drittelmitbestimmungslücke im Dienstleistungssektor: 
Ausmaß und Bestimmungsgründe, Januar 2009 
No.113:  Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre: Forschungsbericht 2008, Januar 2009 
No.112:  Nils Braakmann: The role of psychological traits and the gender gap in full-time 
employment and wages: Evidence from Germany. January 2009 
No.111:  Alexander Vogel: Exporter Performance in the German Business Services Sector: First 
Evidence from the Services Statistics Panel. January 2009 
[revised version forthcoming in: The Service Industries Journal] 
No.110:  Joachim Wagner: Wer wird subventioniert? Subventionen in deutschen 
Industrieunternehmen 1999 – 2006. Januar 2009 
No.109:  Martin F. Quaas, Stefan Baumgärtner, Sandra Derissen, and Sebastian Strunz: 
Institutions and preferences determine resilience of ecological-economic systems. 
December 2008 
No.108:  Maik Heinemann: Messung und Darstellung von Ungleichheit. November 2008 
No.107:  Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner: Union Membership and Age: The inverted U-
shape hypothesis under test. November 2008 
No.106:  Alexander Vogel & Joachim Wagner: Higher Productivity in Importing German 
Manufacturing Firms: Self-selection, Learning from Importing, or Both? November 
2008 
[revised version forthcoming in: Review of World Economics] 
No.105:  Markus Groth: Kosteneffizienter und effektiver Biodiversitätsschutz durch 
Ausschreibungen und eine ergebnisorientierte Honorierung: Das Modellprojekt 
„Blühendes Steinburg“. November 2008 
No.104:  Alexander Vogel & Joachim Wagner: Export, Import und Produktivität 
wissensintensiver KMUs in Deutschland. Oktober 2008  
No.103:  Christiane Clemens & Maik Heinemann: On Entrepreneurial Risk – Taking and the 
Macroeconomic Effects Of Financial Constraints, October 2008 
No.102:  Helmut Fryges & Joachim Wagner: Exports and Profitability – First Evidence for 
German Manufacturing Firms. October 2008 
No.101:  Heike Wetzel: Productivity Growth in European Railways: Technological Progress, 
Efficiency Change and Scale Effects. October 2008 
No.100:  Henry Sabrowski: Inflation Expectation Formation of German Consumers: Rational or 
Adaptive? October 2008 
No.99:  Joachim Wagner: Produktdifferenzierung in deutschen Industrieunternehmen 1995 – 
2004: Ausmaß und Bestimmungsgründe, Oktober 2008 
No.98:  Jan Kranich: Agglomeration, vertical specialization, and the strength of industrial 
linkages, September 2008 
No.97:  Joachim Wagner: Exports and firm characteristics - First evidence from Fractional Probit 
Panel Estimates, August 2008 
No.96:  Nils Braakmann: The smoking wage penalty in the United Kingdom: Regression and 
matching evidence from the British Household Panel Survey, August 2008 
      
No.95:  Joachim Wagner: Exportaktivitäten und Rendite in niedersächsischen 
Industrieunternehmen, August 2008 
[publiziert in: Statistische Monatshefte Niedersachsen 62 (2008), 10,552-560] 
No.94:  Joachim Wagner: Wirken sich Exportaktivitäten positiv auf die Rendite von deutschen 
Industrieunternehmen aus?, August 2008 
[publiziert in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 88 (2008) 10, 690-696] 
No.93:  Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner: The aging of the unions in West Germany,  
1980-2006, August 2008 
[forthcoming in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik] 
No.92:  Alexander Vogel and Stefan Dittrich: The  German turnover tax statistics panels, August 
2008 
[published in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 128 (2008), 4, 661-670] 
No.91:  Nils Braakmann: Crime does pay (at least when it’s violent!) – On the compensating 
wage differentials of high regional crime levels, July 2008 
No.90:  Nils Braakmann: Fields of training, plant characteristics and the gender wage gap in 
entry wages among skilled workers – Evidence from German administrative data, July 
2008 
No.89:  Alexander Vogel: Exports productivity in the German business services sector: First 
evidence from the Turnover Tax Statistics panel, July 2008 
No.88:   Joachim Wagner: Improvements and future challenges for the research infrastructure in 
the field Firm Level Data, June 2008 
No.87:  Markus Groth: A review of the German mandatory deposit for one-way drinks packaging 
and drinks packaging taxes in Europe, June 2008 
No.86:  Heike Wetzel: European railway deregulation. The influence of regulatory ans 
environmental conditions on efficiency, May 2008 
No.85:  Nils Braakmann: Non scholae, sed vitae discimus! - The importance of fields of study for 
the gender wage gap among German university graduates during market entry and the 
first years of their careers, May 2008 
No.84:  Markus Groth: Private ex-ante transaction costs for repeated biodiversity conservation 
auctions: A case study, May 2008 
No.83:  Jan Kranich: R&D and the agglomeration of industries, April 2008 
No.82:  Alexander Vogel: Zur Exporttätigkeit unternehmensnaher Dienstleister in Niedersachsen - 
Erste Ergebnisse zu Export und Produktivität auf Basis des Umsatzsteuerstatistikpanels, 
April 2008 
No.81:  Joachim Wagner: Exporte und Firmenerfolg: Welche Firmen profitieren wie vom 
internationalen Handel?, März 2008 
No.80:  Stefan Baumgärtner: Managing increasing environmental risks through agro-biodiversity 
and agri-environmental policies, March 2008 
No.79:  Thomas Huth: Die Quantitätstheorie des Geldes – Eine keynesianische Reformulierung, 
März 2008 
No.78:  Markus Groth: An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation 
contracts, March 2008 
 
(see www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers for a complete list)    
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Postfach 2440 
D-21314 Lüneburg 
Tel.: ++49 4131 677 2321 
email: brodt@leuphana.de 
www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers  
 